Since it first began to deliver judgments in cases concerning migrant applicants in the 1980s, the European Court of Human Rights has issued a number of landmark rulings roundly vindicating migrants' rights. These, however, are the exception to the rule of Strasbourg deference to state powers of immigration control. This article critically examines the evolving practice of the Court towards definition and use of the concepts of family life and private life in cases involving migrants who seek to resist deportation by invoking Article 8 ECHR. The examination reveals an approach on the part of the Court which has the effect of shrinking the protection potential of Article 8 for migrant applicants, allowing state interest in expulsion to carry the day. While this may be symptomatic of Strasbourg deference to state sovereignty in the realm of migration, its implications for migrants in the member states of the Council of Europe are far-reaching. The article concludes by highlighting the tools at the Court's disposal which could be employed to construct a more human rights-consistent approach in this strand of jurisprudence, an issue all the more relevant in light of the growing number of migrants seeking to establish a life in Europe.
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Court in its jurisprudence has seen it subsume spheres as diverse as physical integrity and data collection under the heading of private life and accommodate changing social structures through a flexible definition of family life. In relation to migrants, the family and private life limb(s) of Article 8 has been successfully invoked to both secure entry to the host state of a migrant's family member 2 and to resist expulsion 3 from a host state. 4 The latter cases consist in migrant applicants arguing that removal from the respondent state entails separation from family members, thereby violating their right to respect for family life and/or private life as enshrined in Article 8.
In its case law concerning expulsion the Court usually begins its assessment of an alleged violation by determining whether the applicant enjoys 'private and family life' in the host state within the meaning of Article 8, the burden of the present article. If such private and/or family life is found to exist, the Court accepts that expulsion would constitute an interference. To ascertain whether such interference is justified and does not violate Article 8, or conversely is not justified and thereby violates Article 8, the ECtHR examines the proposed or effected deportation through the lens of Article 8(2) which sets out the conditions necessary in order for an interference with Article 8 rights to be justified. Netherlands, Grand Chamber (GC), Appl. no. 12738/10, Judgment of 3 October 2014. 5 The full text of Article 8(2) is: There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 3 undertake a balancing exercise to ascertain whether the interference with family and / or private life in the form of expulsion is a measure which is proportionate to the achievement of the legitimate aim identified under Article 8(2).
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In this article I argue that the ECtHR is applying Article 8 in a way which reduces its scope of protection for migrant, as distinct from non-migrant, applicants. It does this, firstly, by tending to define family life for migrants as the nuclear or core family of parents and their dependent, minor children. This has the effect of depriving the family life limb of Article 8 of its protection potential for adult migrants who have neither a spouse/partner nor dependent children in the host state. Secondly, where the Court finds either that family life does not exist for the purposes of Article 8 or has not sustained an interference sufficient to give rise to a violation, it typically fails to then consider whether expulsion violates the private life limb of Article 8. In the absence of a meaningful examination of migrants' private life in Article 8
cases, the family ties that do not fall within the concept of the nuclear family may therefore be to all intents and purposes disregarded by the Court. This approach to Article 8 in migration cases has the effect of making it easier for states to effect expulsion of migrants.
The argument advanced in this article challenges the claim that the Court's narrow definition of family life in migration cases does not result in a 'diminution of human rights democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. protection '. 7 It also addresses the mis-identification of a shift in the ECtHR's migrationrelated jurisprudence from a wide to a narrow definition of family life. 8 More generally, the article builds on and chimes with recent work by Marie-Bénédicte Dembour which characterizes the Court's case law concerning migrants as so deferential to state powers of immigration control that the ECtHR often seems to be at pains not to upset states in the migration-related rulings it delivers.
9
The article very briefly addresses in section two the argument from state sovereignty which some may advance so as to give the Court carte blanche to shrink the protection potential of Article 8 for migrant applicants. 67 See, for example, the concurring opinion in Nasri of Judge Wildhaber who found the invocation of the right to respect for family life without any reference to private life to be 'artificial', arguing that it would be more realistic to look at 'the whole social fabric which is important to the applicant, and the family is only part of the entire context, albeit an essential one.' Nasri, supra note 33. This view was echoed in the partly dissenting and strongly pro- Ronen, supra note 7, at 286. Slivenko is an important case if only for the visibility and influence lent to it by its Grand Chamber status. Outside of the discrete category of cases taken against Latvia by formerly lawful long-term residents, its impact is less clear. In the two Grand Chamber judgments on the merits concerning expulsion which immediately followed Slivenko, Üner 81 The focus of the Grand Chamber in both cases, however, was on whether the interference violated the right to respect for family life.
82
The absence of any substantive reference to Slivenko in both Üner and Maslov may be due to the fact that in the two latter cases the applicants were found to have family life with which deportation interfered. In Üner, however, as the Court found that deportation did not 81 Üner, supra note 11, at § 59; Maslov, supra note 11, at § 63. 82 In Üner at § 61 the Court expressly stated that while the impugned measures interfered with the applicant's right to respect for private life, it would pay 'special attention' to his right to respect for family life. In Maslov at § 50 it was argued on behalf of the applicant that the impugned measures 'first and foremost' affected his family life. The artificial nature of the separation of the private and family life limbs is underlined by the fact that in ascertaining whether interference with the right to respect for family life is proportionate, the Court attaches significant weight to private life factors. See for example Üner at § 14 for discussion of the applicant's conduct while in prison and Maslov at § § 77-85 for discussion of the nature and seriousness of the offences committed by the applicant. While these may be characterized as private life factors, it is of course necessary for them to be evaluated with a view to assessing the threat an individual migrant may pose to public order in the host state. the Court to adopt one of these two approaches not just for the sake of the clarity and consistency of its case law, but so as to ensure that it retains credibility and the ability to rebut the allegation that it is a human rights court which, when delivering judgment on complaints brought by migrant applicants, is at pains not to upset states.
112 different in tone from most other rulings in expulsion cases where the principle is usually stated in terms more deferential to states.
